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4 February 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Director, Research and Reports

THROUGH : Chief, Economic Research, ORR

FROM : Chief, Industrial Division, ORR

SUBJECT : Forthcoming Meeting with [REDACTED] OSI, on 4 February 1959

25X1A9a

1. The forthcoming meeting is to cover the problem of responsibility and capability for supporting the [REDACTED] group 25X1A6a and other US intelligence components in Germany on the subject of deployment of guided missiles in the Soviet Bloc. According to 25X1A9a [REDACTED] the S&T Staff of CIA's group in [REDACTED] is getting 25X1A6a considerable pressure from [REDACTED] 25X1X7 to evaluate and give operational support on guided missile deployment. 25X1A9a [REDACTED] the former Chief of the S&T Staff, wants to discuss the following aspects of this problem:

- a. The interests and needs for this type of support.
- b. The capabilities of the CIA group in [REDACTED] 25X1A6a
- c. The assistance which is required and given by the Washington Headquarters.

2. The following information is provided for your background:

- a. The CIA group in [REDACTED] 25X1A6a S&T as well as Strategic Staff, was not aware until recently that ORR, rather than OSI, had the responsibility for deployment of guided missiles. No formal notification to this effect has been transmitted to 25X1A6a [REDACTED] as far as I know.
- b. [REDACTED] 25X1A9a is following guided missiles in the Strategic Branch along with several other responsibilities. I think he is not fully aware of ORR's responsibility for deployment.

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c. The S&T Staff, [REDACTED] would probably like to get this responsibility (with or without an experienced ORR missile analyst assigned to S&T Staff.)

d. Reports are received from US and other intelligence collectors in Germany and Austria which state (in various degrees of detail) that missiles are deployed in the Satellites. Generally, these are unevaluated and of doubtful reliability. Of the many such reports received to date, none have been proved to be true. Often the field has not checked the reports, and even when this has been done, the field check is frequently not forwarded to Washington.

25X1A6a e. It is doubtful that any one analyst can give the [REDACTED] 25X1A6a [REDACTED] the kind of support it thinks it needs because he will not have at hand the wide variety of sources and resources necessary for a good evaluation.

3. The following are recommended for an ORR position on this subject:

a. Since ORR is responsible for this subject at Headquarters, it should retain this responsibility in [REDACTED] 25X1A6a through its representatives with the Strategic Staff.

25X1A9a b. [REDACTED] who will be visiting the Strategic Staff this month, has been instructed to look into this matter and make recommendations. Meanwhile, ORR's replacement for [REDACTED] 25X1A9a (coming up this summer) should be thoroughly briefed on all aspects of the missiles problem, particularly deployment.

c. We should require that the field check as many of these reports as possible without individual requests from Headquarters. Furthermore, the results of these checks should be forwarded to us.

d. ORR currently is preparing a comprehensive report evaluating all reported guided missile launching sites. This report is nearing completion with respect to the USSR; a similar report on the Satellites has just been started. These studies were requested by the DD/P, and it is our intention to supplement them on a quarterly basis. These should be made available to

25X1A6a [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] 25X1A

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